The fact that Hungary’s pro-Moscow foreign policy has managed to alienate key partners like the United States, Germany and regional allies within the Visegrád Group isn’t much of a success story for Budapest. But at least Hungary’s 36 year old Minister of Foreign Affairs, Péter Szijjártó, got an admittedly warm reception in Tatarstan this week, where he inaugurated the Hungarian consulate general in the republic’s capital, Kazan. Tatarstan (population: 3.8 million) is part of the Russian Federation and is among the most industrialized regions in central Russia. The region is primarily Muslim (55% of the total population) and some of the republic’s public holidays are tied to Islam as well (such as Eid al fitr), especially following a revival in this form of religious identity after the fall of the Soviet Union. But unlike Chechnya, Tatarstan doesn’t pose a serious separatist threat for Russia. In fact, while Tatarstan claims that it is merely “associated” with Russia, but otherwise “independent,” Russian President Vladimir Putin has managed to implement a process of centralization which very much questions the notion of “association.” Some scholars argue that the use of asymmetrical federalism in defining Kazan’s relationship with Moscow helped to “resolve” the problem of separatism. Political Scientist Gulnaz Sharafutdinova wrote an insightful study on this question and it’s well worth a read.
For Tatarstan, however, an official visit by a Hungarian foreign minister is seen as somewhat of a status symbol and a public relations win. The Government of the Republic of Tatarstan issued three press releases relating to Mr. Szijjártó’s visit. Acting Tatarstan President Rustam Minnikhanov confirmed that “all projects proposed by our Hungarian colleagues will obtain overall support in Tatarstan.” The president then applauded Budapest for strengthening its relationship with Russia.
“Mr. Minnikhanov expressed his gratitude to the leadership of Russia and Hungary for supporting economic and cultural projects between Tatarstan and Hungary. He stressed that the meeting of Russia-Hungary intergovernmental commission on economic cooperation coincided with the opening of the Consulate General of Hungary in Kazan, which should strengthen the relationship between Russia and Hungary,” notes the government’s press release. Apparently, Tatarstan and Hungarian energy companies are “carrying out mutual work today,” but Mr. Minnikhanov trusts that he will be able to deepen and “enrich” his relationship with the Orbán government far beyond energy issues. Tatarstan is a regional leader within the Russian Federation when it comes to the production of automobile parts, and Hungary is exploring partnerships in this field as well.
In another pres release issued on April 10th, Mr. Minnikhanov noted that “Tatarstan appreciates the opportunity to develop cooperation with Hungary within the framework of Russia-Hungary relations.”
For his part, Mr. Szijjártó has high hopes and expectations attached to not only the opening of the new Hungarian consulate general in Kazan, but also to new, direct commercial flights between Budapest and Tatarstan’s capital, which are being launched by Hungarian discount carrier Wizz Air.
“We expect not only a big number of Hungarian visas to be issued by our Consulate-General but a new stage of development of our economic, trade and cultural relations, especially as the competence of the Consulate applies to the whole Volga District,” noted Mr. Szijjártó. The Hungarian foreign minister added that Hungary aims to deepen “pragmatic” relations with Russia. This is generally code for the Orbán government’s efforts to avoid any discussions of western sanctions or other punitive measures against Russia for its aggression in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. In concrete terms, the Orbán government is trying to turn around the 15% decline in Hungarian exports to Russia (which amounts to a loss of $510 million). Additionally, Budapest is hoping to convince Russia of more than doubling the amount of Gazprom gas stored in Hungary. Mr. Szijjártó reportedly also has a commitment from Russia to allow for 22 Hungarian meat processing companies to begin selling their products in Russian markets later this year.
Earlier this year, it appeared as though Budapest was shifting away from its controversial eastern (pro-Russian) foreign policy to one that focuses on Africa and Latin America instead. But now that the fighting in eastern Ukraine is no longer headline news and the western pressure to have Budapest get in line with overall European and transatlantic interests is no longer as persistent, Budapest’s gaze is focused on the east and on Mr. Putin once again.